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CHAPTER 3 
Corporations and Business Associations 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 3.1. Agency- Scope of Actual and Apparent Authority of Corporate 
Officers.* Under Massachusetts law, the authority to manage the business 
affairs of the corporation is vested principally in the board of directors. 1 
Corporate officers, as agents of the corporation, possess no general au-
thority to bind the corporation contractually. 2 An officer's authority to 
enter into binding contracts on behalf of the corporation devolves from 
either a delegation of actual authority by the board or an imputation of 
authority under the apparent authority doctrine.3 
Delegation of actual authority by a board of directors may be either 
express or implied.4 Express actual authority is vested in a corporate 
officer as a result of explicit manifestations by the board to the officer. 5 
Such manifestations may include language of a by-law ,6 a vote of the 
board explicitly giving an officer the power to bind the corporation in a 
particular matter, 7 or a grant by the board to an officer of the powers of a 
general manager. 8 
t Anne T. Foley, Thomas Finigan. 
* Anne T. Foley, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.1. 1 See G.L. c. 156B, §54, which states, "The directors may exercise all the powers 
of the corporation, except such as by law, by the articles of organization or by the by-laws of 
the corporation are conferred upon or reserved to the stockholders." 
2 See Hurley v. Ornsteen, 311 Mass. 477,481, 42 N.E.2d 273, 276(1942); Kelly v. Citizens 
Finance Co. of Lowell, Inc., 306 Mass. 531, 532, 28 N.E.2d 1005, 1006 (1940). 
3 Kelly, 306 Mass. at 532-33, 28 N.E.2d at 1006 (Appeals Court cited several Massachu-
setts cases in which officers were given general authority to make contracts as result of 
express or implied delegation of actual authority by board of directors). 
4 Id. at 533, 28 N.E.2d at 1006. 
5 W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS, A-95 (5th ed. 1980) (authors provide 
general background information regarding selected agency terms and doctrines). 
6 Kelly, 306 Mass. at 533,28 N.E.2d at 1006. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. See Selame Associates, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 412, 420(0. Mass. 
1978), where the court stated that a general manager has the broadest authority of all 
business agents. The agent in Selame was general manager of a Holiday Inns waterfront 
complex. /d. He was found to have actual authority to bind Holiday Inns to a contract which 
involved moorage operations of the complex. /d. See also Neilson v. Malcolm Kenneth Co., 
303 Mass. 437, 440-41, 22 N.E.2d 20, 22-23 (1939) (general manager in charge of corpora-
tion's factory had implied actual authority to employ person to work on machine used in 
regular course of business). 
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Implied actual authority, on the other hand, is authority which may be 
reasonably or customarily inferred by the agent from a more general grant 
of express actual authority by the principal.9 In determining whether 
implied actual authority exists in a corporate officer, courts have focused 
on the question of how a person in the particular agent's position would 
have reasonably interpreted his authority given the particular manifesta-
tions of express authority by his principal. 10 The presence of either ex-
press or implied actual authority is adequate to bind the corporation 
contractually. In addition, the third party contracting with the officer need 
not be aware that the officer has actual authority in order for the corpora-
tion to be bound.U 
If an officer lacks both express and implied actual authority, the corpo-
ration may still be bound by the officer's actions under the agency doc-
trine of apparent authority .12 Apparent authority is created by the words, 
conduct or acquiescence of a principal which leads an outside contracting 
party reasonably to believe that actual authority exists for an agent's 
actions .13 In determining whether apparent authority may be imputed to a 
corporate officer, courts have focused on the question of how an outside 
contracting party would reasonably interpret the putative agent's author-
ity in light of the particular principal's manifestations.14 
The Supreme Judicial Court has stated on repeated occasions that a 
9 W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, at A-95. 
1° Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 331, 439 N.E.2d 311, 
312 (1982). The Appeals Court found the language of the agent's job description created 
implied actual authority to alter a nonfundamental term of a loan. I d. at 330-31, 439 N.E.2d 
at 314-15. The court stated that the agent's act was not a sale of property of the corporation 
or any step which in the business context was so major or unusual that a businessperson in 
the agent's position would have expected it to require a vote of the board. Id. at 331, 439 
N.E.2d at 315. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 33 (1958), which states, 
"An agent is authorized to do, and to do only, what it is reasonable for him to infer that the 
principal desires him to do in the light of the principal's manifestations and the facts as he 
knows or should know them at the time he acts." 
11 M. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, at A-95. 
12 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at§ 27, which states: 
Apparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken 
words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the 
third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf 
by the person purporting to act for him. 
The Appeals Court inKanavos, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 331-32,439 N.E.2d at.315, noted that 
the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the RESTATEMENT view in Neilson v. Malcolm Kenneth 
Co., 303 Mass. 437, 441, 22 N.E.2d 20, 22 (1939). 
13 W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 5, at A-95. 
14 Kanavos, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 331,439 N.E.2d at 315. See also Brownell v. Tide Water 
Associated Oil Co., 121 F.2d 239, 244 (lst Cir. 1941) (court stated that the actions of the 
principal and the knowledge of a reasonable person in the position of the third party are the 
important considerations in finding apparent authority). 
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corporate officer is not clothed with apparent authority as a result of 
merely holding a corporate position. 15 Apparent authority also cannot be 
based on the putative agent's own words or conduct; rather, the manifes-
tations must emanate from the principal. 16 The Appeals Court has stated 
that the ''variety of circumstances'' surrounding a given transaction must 
be examined to determine whether apparent authority to bind the corpora-
tion to the contract has been createdY In examining claims based upon 
the purported apparent authority of a corporate officer, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has given consideration to the position the putative agent 
held within the corporation, the nature of the usual activities of the 
corporation, whether the particular contract was within the scope of these 
usual activities and, in some cases, whether the principal has had re-
peatedly acquiesced in the agent's course of conduct. 18 All of these 
considerations relate to one of the essential elements of apparent author-
ity: the reasonableness of the third party's belief that the agent had 
authority to bind the corporation.19 
15 Hurley v. Omsteen, 311 Mass. 477, 481, 42 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1942) (putative agents' 
positions as president and treasurer, and clerk, respectively, were not enough alone to 
confer authority to bind corporation); Kelly v. Citizens Finance Co. of Lowell, Inc., 306 
Mass. 531, 532, 28 N.E.2d 1005, 1006 (1940) (position of president and treasurer not 
sufficient alone to bind corporation); James F. Monaghan Inc. v. M. Lowenstein & Jones 
Inc., 290 Mass. 331, 333, 195 N.E. 101, 102 (1935) (merely holding office of vice president 
not enough to bind corporation). See also Sheldon v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 
Etc., 566 F.2d 805, 808 (1st Cir. 1977) (authority not conferred by mere fact alleged agent 
was an officer). 
16 See Sheldon, 566 F.2d at 808 (where the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit stated the "fundamental rule" that apparent authority cannot be created by the 
putative agent's own manifestations, only by the principal's). See also Brownell v. Tide 
Water Associated Oil Co., 121 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 1941); Hennessey v. Cities Service 
Refining Co., 282 Mass. 487, 489, 185 N.E. 7, 8 (1933); and RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at 
§ 285. 
17 Kanavos, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 332,439 N.E.2d at 315. See infra note 42 and accom-
panying text. 
18 See, e.g., Hurley, 311 Mass. at 482, 42 N.E.2d at 276, where the Court stated that there 
was no apparent authority since the agent had neither entered previously into an accord and 
satisfaction on behalf of the corporation nor engaged in a course of conduct which could 
imply acquiescence on the part of the board. Similarly, in Kelly, 306 Mass. at 532-33, 28 
N.E.2d at 1006, the Court stated that the evidence did not support a finding of apparent 
authority in the officer to bind the corporation to an employment contract which the agent 
entered into with an attorney for the purpose of defending the corporation in a lawsuit. The 
Court found the defense of such a suit did not fall within the customary duties of a president 
or a treasurer, and there was no evidence the alleged agent had exercised general manage-
ment powers over the corporation or had dealt habitually in the defense of lawsuits. /d. In 
Monaghan, 290 Mass. at 333, 195 N.E. at 102, the Court found a vice president did not have 
apparent authority to enter into an employment contract with the plaintiff to draw up plans 
for a finishing plant, since the planned finishing plant was not a part of the regular business of 
the corporation. 
19 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at§ 27. In Neilson v. Malcolm Kenneth Co., 303 
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In a recent application of these apparent authority principles, the Ap-
peals Court stated that when a corporate officer is allowed to exercise 
general corporate duties, the corporation should be bound by his actions if 
he convincingly appears to have the power to enter into the particular 
transaction.20 The Appeals Court further stated, however, that this prin-
ciple does not apply to transactions outside the scope of a corporation's 
normal activities.21 During the Survey year, the Appeals Court once again 
applied these principles and found apparent authority lacking in Rubel v. 
Hayden, Harding & Buchanan, Inc. 22 
Rubel concerned an action brought against Hayden, Harding & Bucha-
nan, Inc. (HHB), a civil engineering firm, for payment of a finder's fee.23 
The issue before the Appeals Court was whether John Hayden (Hayden), 
president, treasurer, chairman of the board of directors and chief adminis-
trative officer of HHB, had either actual or apparent authority to bind 
HHB to pay the plaintiff, Warren Rubel (Rubel), a finder's fee.24 At the 
time of the disputed transaction, HHB was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Peabody Gallion Company, a fact known to Rubel. 25 HHB held a minority 
interest in Venusca, a Venezuelan engineering firm. 26 Hayden had been 
asked by his associates in Venusca to help them locate a source of 
financing for a residential construction project in Venezuela which they 
wanted to undertake.27 
In an effort to assist Venusca, Hayden arranged several meetings with 
Rubei.28 At the second of their two meetings, Rubel broached the subject 
of compensation should he be able to locate a source of capitai.29 Rubel 
advanced several compensation formulae, all of which seemed reasonable 
Mass. 437, 44(}.41, 22 N.E.2d 20, 22-23 (1939), the Court found that the circumstances were 
such that it would be reasonable for a third party to assume that the agent had authority to 
bind the corporation. The alleged agent was both president and general manager of a 
corporation which manufactured men's clothing. Id. at 440, 22 N.E.2d at 22. The agent 
entered into a contract with the plaintiff under which the plaintiff was to fix a machine. /d. 
The Court found that since the plaintiff knew the agent was generally in charge of the 
manufacturing plant and since the machine which was to be repaired was related to the 
business of the corporation, the plaintiff could reasonably have believed that the agent had 
authority to bind the corporation contractually. Id. at 441, 22 N.E.2d at 23. 
2° Kanavos, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 333, 439 N.E.2d at 316. 
21 ld. 
22 15 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 444 N.E.2d 1306 (1983). 
23 Id. at 252-53, 444 N.E.2d at 13()6.07. 
24 Id. at 253, 444 N.E.2d at 1307. 
25 ld. at 254, 444 N.E.2d at 1307. The parent corporation was also referred to as Peabody 
International in the trial testimony. /d. 
26 Id. at 253, 444 N.E.2d at 1307. 
27 Id. Venusca required $1,160,000 in start-up capital. ld. 
2s Id. 
29 ld. 
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to Hayden.30 Hayden, however, told Rubel that it would be necessary for 
Hayden himself to discuss the matter with others before making any 
decision.31 Hayden and Rubel did agree that Rubel would travel to Ven-
ezuela to familiarize himself with the project.32 
Shortly thereafter, Rubel presented Hayden with a preliminary agree-
ment for the provision of the necessary financing by First National Bank 
ofChicago.33 Peabody Gallion, the parent ofHHB, however, turned down 
the Venusca residential development, thus terminating the need for the 
fun"'s. Subsequently, Hayden refused to discuss the matter with Rubel. 34 
Rubel brought suit in superior court for payment of his finder's fee. 35 
Although the jury found in Rubel's favor, the judge granted a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of HHB.36 Rubel appealed to the 
Appeals Court. 
In assessing the superior court's decision, the Appeals Court found no 
evidence upon which to base a finding that HHB expressly delegated 
authority to Hayden to obligate the corporation to Rubel. 37 The court 
noted the lack of any explicit manifestation, such as a vote of the board of 
directors of HHB, which would create an agency in Hayden to bind HHB 
in connection with the Venusca project.38 Though Hayden held several 
prominent positions within HHB, the court found this insufficient to 
ascribe authority. In support of its finding, the court cited cases in which 
the Supreme Judicial Court had been reluctant to allow titles or trappings 
of office to be the basis of a corporate officer's authority. 39 
The Appeals Court noted that in a recent case, Kanavos v. Hancock 
Bank & Trust Co. ,40 it had found the "variety of circumstances" sufficient 
to ascribe to the executive vice president of the defendant bank the 
apparent authority to modify a loan agreement. 41 The Rubel court, 
30 Jd. 
31 Jd. 
32 Jd. 
33 Jd. at 254, 444 N.E.2d at 1307. 
34 Jd. 
35 Jd. at 252, 44 N.E.2d at 1307. The action commenced in the superior court, where the 
jury rendered a special verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $13,610. Id. 
36 I d. Though no judgment to that effect had yet been entered, Rubel appealed to the 
Appeals Court. Jd. The Appeals Court, on procedural grounds, stated that Rubel's appeal 
ought to be dismissed. /d. at 252-53, 444 N.E.2d at 1307. However, since the case had been 
briefed and argued, the court decided to reach the merits and leave it to the parties and to the 
superior court to straighten out the procedural details. Jd. at 253, 444 N.E.2d at 1307. 
37 Jd. at 254, 444 N.E.2d at 1308. 
38 Jd. 
39 Jd. at 254-55, 444 N.E.2d at 1308. See supra note 15 for cases to which the court 
referred. 
40 14 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 439 N.E.2d 311 (1982). 
41 Jd. at 333, 444 N.E.2d at 315-16. The Kanavos court also found implied actual author-
5
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however, distinguished the circumstances in Kanavos. According to the 
court, unlike the situation in Kanavos, the subject matter of the alleged 
agent's contract in Rubel was outside the normal scope of HHB's busi-
ness. 42 The Rubel court noted that investment in real estate was not within 
the range of usual activities of HHB.43 This, together with the fact Rubel 
knew of HHB's status as a wholly owned subsidiary of Peabody Gallion, 
led the court to conclude that Rubel could not have reasonably assumed 
that Hayden had authority to bind HHB in a business deal which was 
related only incidentally to its normal business. 44 
In addition to finding that the "variety of circumstances" was in-
sufficient to support a finding of apparent authority, the Appeals Court 
further stated that Hayden's own words and conduct could not create 
apparent authority. 45 According to the court, such authority could only be 
created by the principal's words or conduct. Finally, the court noted that 
apparent authority could not be created in this case by the principal's 
acquiescence, since it had not been shown that HHB had allowed Hayden 
to enter into such contracts over an extended period of time.46 
The Rubel court's finding that neither actual nor apparent authority to 
bind the corporation existed on the basis of the facts presented is based on 
settled Massachusetts precedentY The Supreme Judicial Court has stated 
that express actual authority can be created by means of a by-law or vote 
of the board of directors of the corporation. 48 Neither of these factors was 
present in Rubel. The "variety of circumstances" which the Appeals 
Court found created apparent authority in Kanavos was not present in 
Rubel. 49 The nature of the agreement between Hayden and Rubel was not 
within the range of usual activities of HHB. Furthermore, HHB had not 
acquiesced over an extended period of time in Hayden's binding the 
corporation to such agreements. In sum, it was not reasonable for a 
ity, see supra note 10. A finding of either implied actual authority or apparent authority 
would have been enough to bind the defendant. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 
5, at A-96. In one case, Selame v. Holiday Inns, 451 F. Supp. 412, 420-21 (D. Mass. 1978), 
the court found that the circumstances were such that express actual authority, implied 
actual authority, and apparent authority existed. 
42 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 255, 444 N.E.2d at 1308. Among the other circumstances present 
in Kanavos were: the agent's title as executive vice president, the agent's long course of 
dealing with the plaintiff in arranging loans, the encouragement of"the plaintiff by the 
president of the defendant corporation to deal with the agent, and the secondary rather than 
fundamental nature of the loan modification in question. Kanavos, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 333, 
439 N.E.2d at 315-16. 
43 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 255, 444 N.E.2d at 1308. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at§ 285. 
46 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 256, 444 N.E.2d at 1308. 
47 See supra notes 8, 10, 14-19, 42 and accompanying text. 
48 Kelly, 306 Mass. at 533, 28 N.E.2d at 1006. 
48 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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person in Rubel's position to assume that Hayden had the authority to 
bind HHB to pay Rubel a finder's fee. 
Rubel effects no change in Massachusetts law regarding creation of 
actual or apparent authority. However, the case does provide guidance on 
the minimum factual showing necessary to find apparent authority under 
the current "variety of circumstances" test. Rubel demonstrates that 
titles and trappings of office are not sufficient alone to establish apparent 
authority in a corporate officer to bind a corporation to specific contrac-
tual obligations. 50 Apparent authority is also not imputed from a putative 
agent's words or conduct.51 Finally, Rubel establishes that an outside 
contracting party is not reasonable in assuming authority on the part of a 
corporate officer when the substance of the contract is not within the 
usual day to day activities of the corporation.52 
§ 3.2. Personal Property Tax Exemption for Domestic Business Corpora-
tions.* While taxpayers may organize their affairs so as to minimize 
federal income tax liability, the federal tax law attempts to distinguish 
transactions where form is used to obscure the underlying substance.1 In 
Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has made substance-over-
form determinations concerning tax exemptions for charitable in-
stitutions2 and for property used for religious purposes.3 The substance-
over-form issue may also be raised by the personal property tax exemp-
tion for a Massachusetts domestic business corporation. 
The Massachusetts General Laws provide for a local tax on real and 
personal property owned by inhabitants of the Commonwealth.4 The tax 
50 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 254, 444 N.E.2d at 1308. 
51 Jd. at 255, 444 N.E.2d at 1308. 
52 Jd. 
* By Thomas Finigan, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.2. 1 The substance over form distinction arises in the federal tax area in many 
situations, for example, sale-leaseback transactions. See, e.g., Helvering v. F. R. Lazarus & 
Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (seminal Supreme Court decision on tax consequences of sale 
and leaseback transactions). See also Fuller, Sales and Leasebacks and the Frank Lyon 
Case, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 60, 6(}.65 (1972); Cahn, Some Reflections on the Quest For 
Substance, 30 GEo. L.J. 587, 587-609 (1942). 
2 See, e.g., Lynn Hospital v. Board of Assessors of Lynn, 383 Mass. 14, 18-20, 417 
N.E.2d 14, 17-18 (1981); Meadowbrooke Day Care Center, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 374 
Mass. 509, 5ll-13, 373 N.E.2d 212,214-15 (1978); Boston Symphony Orch., Inc. v. Board of 
Assessors, 294 Mass. 248, 257, 1 N.E.2d 6, 1(}.ll (1936). 
3 See, e.g., United Church of Religious Science v. Board of Assessors, 372 Mass. 280, 
284-85, 361 N.E.2d 1254, 1257-58 (1977); Assessors of Framingham v. First Parish in 
Framingham, 329 Mass. 212, 215-16, 107 N.E.2d 309, 3ll-12 (1952). 
4 G.L. c. 59, § 2 provides: "All property, real and personal, situated within the common-
wealth, and all personal property of the inhabitants of the commonwealth wherever situated, 
unless expressly exempt, shall be subject to taxation." All taxable personal property is 
assessed to the owner in the town in which he is an inhabitant. G.L. c. 59, § 18. 
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applies to all real and personal property, unless the property is statutorily 
exempt.5 Exemptions to the broad scope oflocal taxation are contained in 
chapter 59, section 5. Section 5(2) exempts from local taxation the per-
sonal property of a domestic business corporation.6 A domestic business 
corporation, according to Massachusetts law, is a corporation organized 
under, or subject to, the state incorporation statutes.7 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court considered the 
question of whether a corporation organized for tax purposes by the 
partners of a Boston law firm qualified as a domestic business corporation 
within the meaning of chapter 59, section 5. In Brown, Rudnick, Freed'& 
Gesmer v. Board of Assessors of Boston,8 the Court affirmed the Appel-
late Tax Board's decision that a corporation organized solely for the 
purpose of avoiding taxes was not a domestic business corporation and 
therefore exempt from the local personal property tax.9 
The law partnership of Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer ("BRFG") 
organized a corporation, Briefing, Inc., under chapter 156B, for the stated 
purpose of leasing personal property. 10 All the directors of the corporation 
were partners in BRFG.U Mter forming Briefing, Inc., BRFG transferred 
title to all its personal property to the corporation in exchange for all of 
the corporation's capital stock and a promissory note for $65,000.12 The 
corporation then leased the personal property back to BRFG under a one 
5 G.L. c. 59, § 2. 
6 G.L. c. 59, § 5(2) exempts from taxation: 
[i]n the case of (a) a domestic business corporation or (b) a foreign corporation, both 
as defined in section thirty of chapter sixty-three, all property owned by such 
corporation other than the following: - real estate, poles, underground conduits, 
wires, and pipes, and machinery used in the conduct of the business. 
A discussion of the early history of the exemption for the personal property of domestic 
business corporations can be found in P. NICHOLS, TAXATION IN MASSACHUSETTS, § 5 at 
208-09 (3d ed. 1938). All domestic corporations are required to pay a corporate excise tax to 
the state. G.L. c. 63, § 32. A part of this excise tax is determined by applying a fiat rate to the 
tangible property of the corporation. G.L. c. 63, § 32(a)(l)(i). As a result, in order to avoid a 
double taxation upon the personal property of a domestic corporation, the exemption from 
local taxation is provided. SeeP. NICHOLS, TAXATION IN MASSACHUSETTS,§ 5 at 208 (3d ed. 
1938). For a discussion of the history of the corporate excise tax, see 4 R. BARRETT & A. 
BAILEY, TAXATION, 4 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES, § 801 at 369-70 (2d ed. 1970). 
7 G.L. c. 63, § 3<X:1). 
8 389 Mass. 298, 450 N.E.2d 162 (1983). 
9 Jd. at 305, 450 N.E.2d at 166. 
10 I d. at 299, 450 N.E.2d at 163. In its opinion, the Court summarized the findings of the 
Appellate Tax Board. A more detailed description of the facts is contained in the Board's 
opinion, Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 1 Mass. App. 
Tax Bd. Rep. 70 (1982). 
11 389 Mass. at 299, 450 N.E.2d at 163. 
12 Jd. The personal property transferred included business and office equipment, furni-
ture, furnishings, books, publications, and periodicals. Jd. 
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year lease which was automatically extended from year to year .13 
Briefing, Inc. leased additional equipment to BRFG from time to time at a 
rate predetermined in the lease .14 The corporation supplied BRFG with 
daily office supplies, and in addition, BRFG leased some office equipment 
from other sourcesY Briefing, Inc. never leased property to any entity 
other than BRFG although it had the power to do so by its incorporation 
under chapter 156B.16 Nor did Briefing, Inc. solicit business from any 
outside entity. Its leasing arrangement with BRFG was its exclusive 
source of income. 17 
Briefing, Inc. paid corporate excise taxes for the years 1977-1980.18 Any 
increase in Briefing, Inc.'s rental income resulted from additional pur-
chases of equipment and its subsequent rental to BRFG. 19 These addi-
tional rentals were made to accommodate the partnership's growth 
needs.20 No evidence was introduced that Briefing, Inc.'s business was in 
any way separate from BRFG, or that it had any employees.21 The 
business address of the corporation was the same as that of BRFG, and 
BFRG admitted that the lease was not an arms-length transaction.22 
For the years 1977 through 1981, BRFGfiled a "Form of List" with the 
assessors of the city of Boston, claiming it owned no personal property of 
any kind. 23 In each of the relevant years, however, BRFG was assessed a 
personal property tax by the city of Boston.24 BRFG paid the tax and 
applied for an abatement.25 The board of assessors of Boston denied the 
abatement and BRFG appealed to the Appellate Tax Board (the 
"Board").26 The Board upheld the assessment of the personal property 
taxes, finding that Briefing, Inc. did not qualify as a domestic business 
corporation entitled to a personal property exemption under chapter 59, 
13 ld. 
14 389 Mass. at 300, 450 N.E.2d at 163. 
15 Jd. 
16 ld. 
17 ld. 
18 I d. The amount of Briefing Inc.'s excise tax increased substantially in 1980 as a result of 
accelerated depreciation taken in earlier years, and not as a result of an increase in income or 
business activity. I d. 
19 ld. 
20 Jd. at 300, 450 N.E.2d at 163-64. 
21 Jd. at 300, 450 N.E.2d at 164. There was also no evidence concerning amounts of 
income, expenses, gains or losses of Briefing, Inc. Jd. 
22 Jd. 
23 ld. 
24 Jd. at 300.01, 450 N.E.2d at 164. 
25 Id. at 298, 450 N.E.2d at 163. Application for abatement is provided for in G.L. ·c. 59,§ 
59, by filing in writing with the assessors. 
26 Brown, Rudnick, 1 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. 70 (1982). Appeal to the Appellate Tax 
Board after a denial of an abatement is provided for in G.L. c. 59, § 65. 
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section 5.27 The Board reasoned that Briefing, Inc. was not a "domestic 
business corporation" within the meaning of the statute because it was 
not engaged in "business."28 In making this determination, the Board 
applied the following definition of "business": 
"Business" is a word of large signification and is not susceptible of exact 
definition applicable to all cases. When the purpose of the statutes taxing 
income is considered, the word "business," as used in the section relating 
to the deduction of expenses, must be held to refer to an activity which 
occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood, 
profit or gain.29 
In the Board's view, Briefing, Inc. was not engaged in the business of 
leasing property for profit or gain, and therefore could not be charac-
terized as a viable business entity with respect to the local property tax 
exemption.30 BRFG appealed the decision of the Board to the Supreme 
Judicial Court.31 
In analyzing the issue of whether Briefing, Inc. was entitled to the tax 
exemption, the Court stated that mere compliance with the statutory 
definition of a domestic business corporation would not ensure the 
exemption.32 The Court acknowledged that Briefing, Inc., having been 
properly organized under chapter 156B, was a corporation in form.33 In 
the Court's view, however, ending the inquiry at this point would elevate 
form over substance.34 The Court stated that in cases involving charitable 
institutions claiming an exemption under chapter 59, section 5, it has 
looked to the actual work performed by the charitable corporation to 
determine whether the corporation qualifies for the exemption.35 The 
Court concluded that the same type of analysis was applicable in the 
present case. 36 
In determining whether Briefing, Inc. qualified for an exemption as a 
domestic business corporation, the relevant factor, according to the 
Court, was whether the corporation was operated for "dominantly busi-
ness purposes."37 According to the Court, the definition of "business" 
27 1 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. at 77. 
28 Id. at 74. 
28 Id. (quoting Whipple v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 263 Mass. 476, 485-86, 
161 N.E. 593, 595 (1928)). 
30 1 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. at 74. 
31 Appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court of an adverse decision from the 
Appellate Tax Board is provided for in G.L. c. 58A, § 13. For an explanation of the 
aggrieved taxpayer's remedies and rights of appeal, seeR. BARRETT & A. BAILEY, TAXA-
TION, 4A MAss. PRACTICE SERIES§ 1241 (2d ed. 1970). 
32 389 Mass. at 302, 450 N.E.2d at 165. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 303, 450 N.E.2d at 165. 
""J.d. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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applied by the Board- "an activity which occupies the time, attention 
and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood, profit or gain" - was 
appropriate.38 The Court, reviewing the facts as found by the Board,39 
agreed with the conclusion that Briefing, Inc. was not an "entity con-
ducted for gain or profit." 40 
Relying on a case decided under federal tax law, the Court rejected 
BRFG's argument that Briefing, Inc. was engaged in profit-seeking ac-
tivities and was therefore within the definition of a business which was 
enunciated by the Court in Whipple v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxa-
tion. 41 In the tax case, Higgins v. Smith ,42 the taxpayer sold securities to a 
corporation wholly owned by him in order to realize a loss. 43 The taxpayer 
was denied the deduction by the United States Supreme Court.44 The 
Brown, Rudnick Court identified two principles from Higgins as relevant 
to BRFG's situation. The first principle was that transactions which do 
not vary control or change the flow of economic benefits are to be 
dismissed from consideration.45 Second, the government is not required 
to acquiesce to the taxpayer's choice of whatever form of doing business 
provides him with the most favorable tax consequences.46 Rather, the 
government may look to the reality of the situationY According to the 
Court, the Board implicitly recognized these principles when it decided 
that Briefing, Inc. was not organized for profit.48 The Board could rea-
sonably conclude, the Court noted, that the lease arrangement did not 
"vary control or change the flow of economic benefits" between BRFG 
and Briefing, Inc.49 The Court approved the Board's close examination of 
the true nature of the relationship between Briefing, Inc. and BRFG,50 and 
also affirmed the Board's ultimate finding that the activities of Briefing, 
Inc. were not undertaken for profit.51 In conclusion, the Court held that 
38 Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court). 
39 Under Massachusetts law, the Board's decisions are final as to findings of fact. G.L. c. 
58A, § 13. 
40 389 Mass. at 304, 450 N.E.2d at 166. 
41 Id. at 304-05,450 N.E.2d at 166("[T]he word 'business,' ... must be held to refer to an 
activity which occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood, 
profit or gain." Whipple v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 263 Mass. 476, 485-86, 161 
N.E. 593, 595 (1928)). 
42 308 u.s. 473 (1940). 
43 Id. at 474-75. 
44 Id. at 480. 
43 389 Mass. at 304, 450 N.E.2d at 166 (quoting Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. at 476). 
46 Jd. (citing Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. at 477-78). 
47 ld. 
48 Jd. at 305, 450 N.E.2d at 166. 
49 Id. 
5o Id. 
51 Id. 
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Briefing, Inc. was not entitled to an exemption as a domestic business 
corporation. 52 
The Court distinguished its holding from federal cases which stand for 
the proposition that the taxpayer may organize his affairs in any legal form 
so as to minimize taxes without being penalized by the government for 
doing so.53 The Court interpreted the Board's decision as going only so far 
as to hold that BRFG failed to establish that Briefing, Inc. performed any 
function other than to shelter the firm from local taxation. 54 In the Court's 
view, "escaping taxation is not a 'business' in the ordinary meaning."55 
This result, the Court noted, does not mean, however, that a corporation 
set up to do business only with a parent entity could never qualify as a 
"domestic business corporation."56 
Despite its affirmance of the Board's decision that Briefing, Inc. did not 
qualify as a "domestic business corporation," the Court nevertheless 
remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings.57 In addition to 
the exemption from local taxation provided for a domestic business cor-
poration, the statute allows an exemption from local taxation for a "Mas-
sachusetts corporation."58 According to the Court, the Board determined 
only that Briefing, Inc. was not a domestic business corporation, leaving 
open the question whether Briefing, Inc. was a "Massachusetts corpora-
tion."59 Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the Board to 
determine whether Briefing, Inc. is a Massachusetts corporation within 
the meaning of the statute.60 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Brown, Rudnick, Freed & 
Gesmer makes it clear that compliance with the provisions in chapter 
156B for the formation of a corporation will not, in and of itself, guarantee 
an exemption as a domestic business corporation. The Court, in determin-
ing whether an exemption should be allowed, applied a test which focused 
on whether the corporation was operated for "dominantly business pur-
poses." 61 Application of the "dominantly business purposes" test, how-
ever, adds a gloss to the language of the statutory exemption. The exemp-
tion applies to a domestic business corporation "as defined in section 
52 Id. 
53 ld. See United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 455-56(1950); A. P. 
Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 390 (Ct. Cl. 1960). 
54 389 Mass. at 305-06, 450 N.E.2d at 166. 
55 Id. at 306, 450 N.E.2d at 167 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in National Investors Corp. 
v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir.1944)). 
56 389 Mass. at 305, 450 N.E.2d at 166. 
57 Id. at 306, 450 N.E.2d at 167. 
58 G.L. c. 59, § 5(1). 
59 389 Mass. at 3()6.07, 450 N.E.2d at 165. 
60 ld. 
6
' Id. at 303, 450 N.E.2d at 165. 
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thirty of chapter sixty-three.' ' 62 The definition of domestic corporations in 
chapter 63, section 30 includes those "organized under or subject to ... 
chapter one hundred and fifty-six B."63 The Court admitted that Briefing, 
Inc. was properly formed under chapter 156B.64 To avoid elevating form 
over substance, however, the Court applied both the "dominantly busi-
ness purposes" test and the Whipple Court's definition of business.65 
The decision in Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer will affect the ability 
of a Massachusetts corporation to gain an exemption under chapter 59, 
section 5. In determining whether such an exemption is proper, courts will 
now consider whether the corporation performs any function other than 
to shelter the taxpayer from personal tax liability. The inquiry made with 
respect to a corporation will be similar to the inquiry made with respect to 
the exemptions for charitable institutions and for property used for reli-
gious purposes. Courts will look beyond the form chosen by the taxpayer 
to the substance of the transaction.66 
The Court left open the question whether Briefing, Inc. is a Massachu-
setts corporation and therefore exempt from personal property taxes 
under chapter 59, section 5(1).67 The statute imposes two requirements for 
an exemption under this section. First, the corporation must be a Massa-
chusetts corporation.68 Second, the corporation must be subject to taxa-
tion under chapter 63.69 Briefing, Inc. appears to meet both of these 
requirements. As the Court acknowledged, Briefing, Inc. was properly 
formed under chapter 156B, which made it a Massachusetts corporation.70 
Briefing, Inc. also had paid corporate excise taxes under chapter 63 every 
year since its formation. 71 
It is unlikely, however, that the Board would allow Briefing, Inc. an 
exemption as a Massachusetts corporation. The Board's denial of an 
exemption to Briefing, Inc. as a domestic business corporation was 
strongly worded. In the Board's view, Briefing, Inc. was not a "viable 
62 G.L. c. 59, § 5(2). 
63 G.L. c. 63, § 30(1). 
64 389 Mass. at 303, 450 N.E.2d at 165. 
65 ld. 
66 In its opinion, the Court analogized both to cases involving the exemption for charitable 
institutions- Assessors of Boston v. Vincent Club, 351 Mass. 10, 217 N.E.2d 757 (1966); 
Norwood v. Norwood Civic Ass'n, 340 Mass. 518, 165 N.E.2d 124 (1960); and to cases 
concerning the exemption for property used for religious purposes - United Church of 
Religious Science v. Assessors of Attleboro, 372 Mass. 280, 361 N.E.2d 1254 (1977); 
Assessors of Boston v. Lamson, 316 Mass. 166, 55 N.E.2d 215 (1944). 
67 389 Mass. at 303 n.9, 450 N.E.2d at 165 n.9. 
68 ld. 
69 ld. 
70 389 Mass. at 302, 450 N.E.2d at 165. 
11/d. For the years paid and amount of Briefing, Inc.'s corporate excise taxes, see Brown, 
Rudnick, 1 Mass. APP· Tax Bd. Rep. at 71. 
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business entity conducted for gain or profit; wherefore, it does not merit 
recognition as a taxable entity. " 72 According to the Board, BRFG was the 
only taxable entity, and therefore BRFG, and not Briefing, Inc., was 
charged with the local tax. 73 The Board will likely use the same approach 
in determining whether Briefing, Inc. is entitled to an exemption as a 
Massachusetts corporation. 
The Massachusetts taxpayer who now seeks an exemption as a domes-
tic business corporation would be unwise to incorporate solely for this tax 
advantage. Both the Board and the courts will scrutinize the substance of 
the corporation to determine whether it is a "business" for the purpose of 
the domestic business corporation exemption, with the courts applying a 
"dominantly business purpose" test. Whether a corporation which fails 
to qualify for the domestic business corporation exemption can qualify for 
the Massachusetts corporation exemption is still an unanswered question. 
Given the Board's and the Court's disinclination to allow an exemption 
for a corporation organized solely to avoid taxes, it is unlikely such an 
entity would be able to claim the exemption as a Massachusetts corpora-
tion. 
§ 3.3. Fiduciary Duty of Employees in a Position of Trust - Competing 
with the Corporation.* Directors and officers traditionally have been held 
to OCCJ!PY a fiduciary position within the corporation.1 As fiduciaries, they 
are bound to place the interests of the corporation above their own 
interests.2 This so-called duty of loyalty prevents corporate fiduciaries 
from competing with the corporation while in its employ. 3 An inflexible 
application of this principle of loyalty, however, might unjustly hamper a 
fiduciary's right to seek independent entrepreneurial pursuits and dis-
courage capable persons from holding positions of trust within the corpo-
ration.4 Accordingly, fiduciaries may make preparations for the creation 
72 ld. at 77. 
73 ld. at 74. Under this analysis, Briefing, Inc. should not have been paying any taxes, 
because it did not exist as a tax entity. It is confusing why Briefing, Inc.'s corporate excise 
taxes were accepted for four years if it was not a corporation. The explanation is that 
Briefing, Inc. was caught between two taxing bodies: the city, which was unwilling to 
recognize Briefing, Inc. as a corporation, and the state, which was willing to recognize it as 
such. 
* Anne T. Foley, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.3 1 H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS§§ 235-36, at 625-29(1983). 
2 ld. 
3 § 236, at 628. For example, a fiduciary may not use corporate assets or employees for 
his own benefit, solicit business away from his corporation while in its employ, or make 
secret profits from corporate transactions. Id. 
4 See id.; see also Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564,573 
(1978). The Maryland Metals court stated that the policy of encouraging free competition has 
resulted in the recognition of the right of employees to make preparations to compete with 
14
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of a competing business, as long as in the course of such preparations they 
act in good faith.5 When a fiduciary breaches this duty of loyalty, the 
corporation is entitled to damages ranging from recovery of lost profits to 
repayment of salaries paid to disloyal employees.6 
These general corporate principles are embodied in the leading Massa-
chusetts case, Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant. 7 In Lincoln Stores, the 
Supreme Judicial Court stated that directors and officers are not pre-
cluded from entering into a competing business as long as their actions are 
carried out in good faith. 8 The defendants, two of whom were inside 
directors and one of whom held a nonmanagement position, were found to 
have breached their duty of loyalty by using confidential information 
acquired while in the plaintiff's employ to help them set up their compet-
ing business.9 In addition, the defendants had wrongfully charged to the 
plaintiff corporation travel expenses incurred solely for the defendants' 
benefit.1° For these violations, the defendants were ordered to reimburse 
the plaintiff for the profits it would have earned but for the defendants' 
competition, for the travel expenses wrongfully charged to the plaintiff, 
and for the salaries paid to the defendants during the period of their 
unfaithfulness .11 
The application by the Lincoln Stores Court of the doctrine of fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to a defendant who was neither an officer nor a director 
was not unique. In several Massachusetts cases preceding Lincoln Stores, 
the Court had applied agency principles to hold employees who act in a 
representative capacity liable for disloyal acts. 12 The broadest application 
their employers prior to leaving their employment without incurring liability for breach of 
their fiduciary duty of loyalty. I d. This recognition protects an employee from having to wait 
until he is unemployed before beginning preparations to enter into a competing business. I d. 
5 Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 423, 34 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1941). See 
generally H. HENN & J." ALEXANDER, supra note l, §§ 235-36, at 625-29. 
6 See generally Jacobs, Business Ethics and the Law: Obligations of a Corporate Execu-
tive, 28 Bus. LAw. 1063 (1973) (author discusses remedies available upon finding of breach 
of fiduciary duty). See infra notes 57 and 87 and accompanying text for examples of remedies 
awarded by Massachusetts courts. 
7 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941). 
8 Id. at 423, 34 N.E.2d at 707. 
9 Id. at 418, 424, 34 N.E.2d at 705, 708. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 420, 34 N.E.2d at 706. 
12 See, e.g., Raymond v. Davies, 293 Mass. 117, 119, 199 N.E. 321, 323 (1936). The 
Raymond Court cited Little v. Phipps, 208 Mass. 331, 333, 94 N.E. 260, 261 (1911) for the 
proposition that an agent must exercise ''utmost good faith'' in his dealings with his principal 
and must act with complete loyalty toward his principal. I d. In both Raymond and Little, 
managers of real estate were found to have breached their duty of loyalty to their principals 
by taking secret profits. Similarly, in Quinn v. Burton, 195 Mass. 277, 81 N. E. 257 ( 1907), the 
Supreme Judicial Court stated: 
It is a principle universally recognized, as founded not only on common business 
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of the duty of loyalty can be found in an early Massachusetts case, 
Lindsay v. Swift .13 The Lindsay Court stated that any employee in a 
position of trust is bound to act in good faith in his dealings with his 
employer .14 More specifically, the Court stated that an employee cannot 
use his employer's business for his own profit or enter into conflicting 
transactions without the employer's consent.15 Thus, in Massachusetts, 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty has been held to apply not only to directors 
and officers, but also to agents and employees who occupy a position of 
trust and confidence. 
In Chelsea Industries, Inc. v. Gaffney/6 decided during the Survey 
year, the Supreme Judicial Court again addressed the issue of the 
fiduciary duties owed by employees in a position of trust and indicated the 
extent to which an injured employer may recover damages. 17 The facts of 
Chelsea present a particularly egregious example of disloyal conduct by 
trusted employees.18 The case, therefore, is most instructive for its formu-
lation of the remedies available to an employer who has been harmed by 
extensive disloyal conduct by such employees. 
The defendants in Chelsea, Gaffney and McElroy, were executive 
officers of Ideal Tape Company (Ideal), one of several manufacturing 
morality but on sound public policy, that persons who act in a representative capac-
ity, ... are not permitted in the performance of their duties, to put themselves in a 
position antagonistic to the interests of those whom they represent. 
/d. at 279, 81 N.E. at 257. 
The Quinn Court held that a real estate broker was in breach of his fiduciary duty as a 
result oftaking secret profits./d. at 281, 81 N.E. at 258. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY§ 387 (1958) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] (agent has duty to act solely for 
his principal's benefit). 
13 230 Mass. 407, 119 N.E. 787 (1918). 
14 /d. at 412, 119 N.E. at 789. 
15 /d. In Lindsay, the employee was held not to have breached any duty to his employer 
since he was found not to have induced a customer of his employer to transfer its business to 
a competing business set up by the employee. See also, American Circular Loom Co. v. 
Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 206, 84 N.E. 133, 140 (1908), where the Court stated that an 
employee who holds a position of trust within the corporation is legally bound to not act 
adversely to the interests of the corporation. The defendant-employee was found to have 
violated his fiduciary duty of loyalty by purchasing property with the intention of reselling it 
to the corporation at an inflated price. 
16 389 Mass. 1, 449 N.E.2d 320 (1983). 
17 Since Lincoln Stores, the Supreme Judicial Court has addressed the specific issue of 
breach of fiduciary duty due to competing with the corporation or employer in Anderson 
Corp. v. Blanch, 340 Mass. 43, 162 N.E.2d. 825 (1959); Swaney v. Clark-Wilcox Co., 331 
Mass. 471, 120 N.E.2d 281 (1954); Production Machine Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 99 
N.E.2d 32 (1951); and Walsh v. Atlantic Research Associates, Inc., 321 Mass. 57,71 N.E.2d 
580 (1947). In the Anderson and Production cases, the employees were inside directors. In 
Swaney and Walsh, the employees were agents. 
18 See infra notes 19-51 and accompanying text. 
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divisions of Chelsea Industries, Inc. (Chelsea), a publicly held company .19 
Ideal manufactured pressure sensitive tapes for use primarily in the shoe 
industry.20 Gaffney had been employed by Ideal since 1970 and had been 
promoted to the position of president and general manager in 1973.21 In 
these positions, he had complete responsibility for all of Ideal's opera-
tions with only general supervision from Chelsea.22 McElroy, a chemist, 
had been employed by Ideal since 1964 and in 1976 became its vice 
president of research, development and engineering. 23 
In December, 1975, Gaffney and McElroy, with the intention ofleaving 
Ideal's employ, formed a joint venture to start up their own business in 
competition with Ideal. 24 They were joined by two other employees of 
Ideal in 1976.25 Graff, who joined the venture in the spring of 1976, had 
been an employee of Ideal for several years. 26 He had become its United 
States shoe industry sales manager in 1975 and was promoted to vice 
president for domestic shoe sales in 1977.27 Wormwood, who was vice 
president for manufacturing, joined the venture in December, 1976.28 
In 1976 and 1977, Gaffney and McElroy, accompanied frequently by 
Graff and Wormwood, engaged in several transactions designed to estab-
lish their competing business. One transaction involved the purchase of 
mixing equipment for both Ideal and the planned business.29 Gaffney 
wanted to buy one mixer for each enterprise; the seller, however, insisted 
on disposing of all five of the mixers he was offering in a single sale.30 
Gaffney decided to buy all five mixers and to resell one of them to Ideal at 
19 389 Mass. at 3, 449 N.E.2d at 322. The findings of fact were drawn from the report of a 
master. I d. The superior court adopted the report of the master and confirmed this finding 
that the defendants were liable to Chelsea for setting up a competing business in violation of 
their fiduciary duty ofloyalty. Jd. at 2, 449 N.E.2d at 321. The defendants sought review in 
the Appeals Court; the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court for direct 
appellate review on its own motion. ld. 
20 Jd. at 3, 449 N.E.2d at 322. Pressure sensitive tapes are fabrics coated with an adhesive 
substance which, when applied with pressure to another material, cause the tape to adhere 
to the material. Jd. at 3 n.4, 449 N.E.2d at 322 n.4. 
21 Jd. at 3, 449 N.E.2d at 322. 
22 ld. 
23 Id. McElroy's responsibilities included product development, quality control and over-
all responsibility for Ideal's laboratory. Jd. at 3-4, 449 N.E.2d at 322. 
24 Jd. at 4, 449 N.E.2d at 322. 
25 ld. 
26 Jd. The facts do not indicate the number of years Graff had worked for Ideal. 
27 Jd. Graff was responsible for customer and sales personnel relations as well as for 
marketing Ideal's products. Jd. 
28 I d. Wormwood had responsibility for production at Ideal's three United States plants. 
Jd. at 4 & n.6, 449 N.E.2d at 322 & n.6. 
29 Jd. at 4-5, 449 N.E.2d at 323. 
30 Jd. at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 323. 
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an inflated price. 31 To effectuate the deal without disclosing the defen-
dants' participation, Gaffney arranged for an equipment broker to act as a 
"straw" to buy the equipment from the seller and to resell it to Ideal and 
the defendants. 32 
During the same period of time, the defendants, accompanied by 
Wormwood and occasionally by the ''straw,'' attended auctions in search 
of other equipment.33 At these events, Gaffney would decide which 
equipment would be bid for Ideal, which for the planned business, and the 
price to be bid.34 In addition, Wormwood attended an equipment fair in 
Europe and visited Ideal's plant in Belgium for the purpose of taking 
photographs of Ideal's plans and equipment, all to aid in setting up their 
new business and all at Ideal's expense. 35 The defendants also kept a 
dissatisfied Ideal maintenance mechanic on Ideal's payroll for several 
months until he could be put to work on construction of the defendants' 
factory. 36 
Meanwhile, in April, 1977, DeMartino, the only salesperson working 
out of Ideal's home office, complained to Graff of an excessive work-
load.37 In response, Graff suggested that DeMartino tum over several of 
his major accounts to Gaffney's eighteen-year-old son, who had no sales 
experience.38 DeMartino refused and resigned.39 For several months 
thereafter, Ideal was left with no salesperson in the New England area.40 
Graff and Gaffney, in the meantime, traveled extensively throughout the 
United States, meeting and socializing with Ideal's major customers and 
salespersons, all at Ideal's expenseY Additionally, in August, 1977, on an 
31 ld. The five mixers were bought as a unit for $31,000. Gaffney resold one of them to 
Ideal for $14,000, a price $5,000 in excess of the market value of the mixer. ld. 
32 ld. In order to obtain the necessary requisition from Chelsea, Gaffney instructed the 
"straw" to pay the comptroller a $500 bribe./d. The defendants then delivered a check from 
Ideal for $14,000 to the straw, together with cashier's checks for the balance. /d. 
33 ld. 
34 ld. The master found there was a "clear" conflict of interest on the part of the 
defendants at such events. ld. at 5 n.9, 449 N.E.2d at 323 n.9. 
35 ld. at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 323. The master found this trip was not in the best interests of 
Ideal. ld. 
36 /d. When the mechanic left Ideal's employ, he was replaced with a part-time mechanic. 
The master found this resulted in Ideal's equipment receiving inadequate maintenance./d. at 
6 & n.ll, 449 N.E.2d at 323 & n.11. 
37 ld. at 7, 449 N.E.2d at 324. DeMartino was described in the Chelsea Court's opinion as 
"a very competent salesman, who had established good personal relationships with major 
customers of Ideal in his area." /d .. Furthermore, DeMartino's sales had increased steadily 
over the four years he had been employed by Ideal. /d. 
38 ld. 
39 ld. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. The master found that their intent was to further their competing business's future 
sales. ld. at 7 & n.l3, 449 N.E.2d at 324 & n.l3. 
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application for a Small Business Administration loan for the planned 
business, Gaffney listed current customers of Ideal as prospective cus-
tomers of the competing business he was setting up. 42 Gaffney also dis-
cussed with some of these customers the possibility of continuing to sell 
to them after he left Ideal. 43 
By this time, the two defendants and Wormwood and Graff had met 
frequently to discuss their plans.44 Every effort was made to keep their 
activities secret.45 The four agreed that should any of their plans be 
discovered, they would all leave Ideal simultaneously .46 Gaffney, who 
was responsible for recommending salary increases and bonuses to Ideal, 
continued to recommend increases in compensation and bonuses for 
McElroy, Graff, and Wormwood, despite his knowledge of their disloyal 
acts. 47 In addition, during their two years of planning, from 197 5 until their 
plans were discovered in 1977, the defendants made no effort to train 
replacements for themselves or for Graff and Wormwood, or to allow 
Chelsea to do so. 48 
Shortly after the defendants incorporated their new business in No-
vember, 1977, one of Chelsea's vice presidents discovered the incorpora-
tion and the defendants resigned. 49 When Grru."f's and Wormwood's par-
ticipation was discovered, they too resigned. 5° The void left by the unex-
pected departure of four of the six executive officers at Ideal forced 
Chelsea to divert the services of three Chelsea vice presidents to Ideal so 
that Ideal could continue in operation.51 
42 /d. at 7-8, 449 N.E.2d at 324. 
43 Id. at 8, 449 N.E.2d at 324. Graff had previously given Gaffney a list of potential 
customers who used pressure sensitive tapes, including those who were presently Ideal's 
customers. ld. at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 323. · 
44 Id. at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 323-24. 
45 Id. at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 324. 
46 I d. at 6-7, 449 N.E.2d at 324. The master found that if they all had terminated together 
without prior notice to Chelsea, Ideal would have been left in a substantially weakened 
position and especially vulnerable to competition by the defendants' planned business./d. at 
7 n.l2, 449 N .E.2d at 324 n.l2. 
47 Id. at 8, 449 N.E.2d at 324. 
48 ld. 
49 ld. 
50 Id. at 9, 449 N.E.2d at 325. Upon questioning by a Chelsea executive officer, Gaffney 
denied involvement by anyone else in the joint venture. /d. Subsequently, while testifying 
for a deposition given in this action, Gaffney admitted that Graff and Wormwood had been 
participants. Id. 
51 /d. Two of these officers spent several hours a week for almost eight months at Ideal, 
while the third worked many more hours per week at Ideal for a period of almost two 
months. Id. In addition to the defendants and Graff and Wormwood, Ideal employed two 
other executives, a comptroller and a person in charge of international sales. Id. at 4, 449 
N.E.2d at 322. The latter was brought back from abroad to manage Ideal's sales. ld. at 9 
n.17, 449 N.E.2d at 325 n.17. 
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The Chelsea Court found that the record more than substantiated the 
master's finding that the defendants' acts of disloyalty constituted a 
breach of their fiduciary duty .52 The Court stated that employees who 
occupy a position of trust and confidence owe their employer a duty of 
loyalty and must place their employer's interests above their own.53 The 
Court supported the master's finding that though the defendants and Graff 
and Wormwood were not directors or officers of Chelsea, they were 
trusted executives who made up most of Ideal's management. 54 As such, 
they owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation.55 The Court further stated 
that, although there was no express contractual provision barring the 
defendants from directly competing with Ideal, an executive employee is 
bound to act solely in the best interests of his employer while in his 
employ.56 
In fashioning the appropriate remedies, the Court noted the clear pre-
cedent in Massachusetts for the legal principle that a corporate officer, 
director, or trusted employee can be required to forfeit the right to retain 
his compensation because of acts in violation of his fiduciary duty. 57 This 
principle holds, the Chelsea Court stated, even when there is no showing 
of actual injury to the employer.58 At the defendants' urging, the Court 
also recognized that there was some precedent for allowing a disloyal 
employee to prove the value of his services to the employer and to repay 
52 Id. at 12, 449 N.E.2d at 326. 
53 Id. at 11, 449 N.E.2d at 326. 
54 ld. 
55 ld. 
56 I d. at 11-12, 449 N .E.2d at 326. The Court cited RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at§ 393, 
which states that an agent is under a duty not to compete with his principal on matters within 
the scope of his agency unless the principal consents. The Chelsea Court also cited a 
Maryland case to support its proposition, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 38, 
382 A.2d 564, 568 (1978), which held that a corporate officer or other key employee is 
prohibited from actively competing with his employer while still in his employ despite the 
absence of an express contractual provision to that effect. 
The Chelsea Court left open the issue of how long prior to termination an employee can 
plan a competing business without informing his employer. 389 Mass. at 12 n.20, 449 N.E.2d 
at 326 n.20. In Chelsea, the defendants planned for two years, during the entire time of 
which they acted in breach of their fiduciary duty. I d. 
57 Id. at 12, 449 N.E.2d at 326-27. See Swaney v. Clark-Wilcox Co., 331 Mass. 471, 
475-76, 120 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1954) (salesperson who breached duty ofloyalty by attempting 
to obtain distributive rights to market products to disadvantage of employer ordered to 
forfeit entitlement to commissions); Production Machine Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 379, 
99 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1951) (corporate officer-director who diverted a corporate opportunity 
required to repay salary to the corporation); Raymond v. Davies, 239 Mass. 117, 119-20, 199 
N.E. 321, 323 (1936) (manager of employer's business breached fiduciary duty by taking 
secret profits and thus lost right to compensation); Little v. Phipps, 208 Mass. 331, 333-34, 
94 N.E. 260, 261 (1911) (agent who managed principal's property and took secret profits 
ordered to forfeit compensation). 
58 389 Mass. at 13, 449 N.E. 2d at 327. 
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only that portion of his compensation which is in excess of that value. 59 
The defendants argued that they were entitled to retain their compensa-
tion, since their job as executives of Ideal was to produce profits and 
during their employ Ideal was a profitable company. 60 The Court re-
sponded that an injured corporation's profitability during a disloyal em-
ployee's tenure does not eradicate a proven breach of fiduciary duty.61 
The Court concluded that unless the defendants proved the value of their 
services, they would be required to forfeit their entire compensation.62 
Since the defendants were unable to sustain this burden of proof, the 
Court affirmed the superior court's award to Chelsea of damages equal to 
the compensation paid the defendants over the two-year period of disloyal 
conduct.63 
The Court also affirmed the superior court's award to Chelsea of dam-
ages equal to the compensation paid to Graff and Wormwood during the 
period they assisted the defendants in their venture.64 The Court found 
that the services of the two accomplices benefited the defendants, not 
Chelsea.65 In its affirmance, the Court also noted the direct role the 
defendants played in securing salary increases and bonuses for Graff and 
Wormwood, while concealing from Chelsea the disloyal conduct of these 
employees.66 The Court applied to trusted employees the principle that 
directors and officers are jointly and severally liable if they participate in, 
or approve of, or conceal a breach of fiduciary duty by a fellow officer or 
director.67 The Court thus held that Gaffney and McElroy were jointly 
59 Jd. at 12-13, 449 N.E.2d at 327. See infra text accompanying notes 88-96. 
60 /d. at 13,449 N.E.2d at 327. The master found that Ideal actually lost $140,000in profits 
in fiscal 1977. Jd. at 13 n.21, 449 N.E.2d at 327 n.2l. Since the master was unable to 
determine how much of this loss was due to the defendants' disloyalty, Chelsea's claim for 
lost profits was denied. Jd. 
61 Jd. at 14, 449 N.E.2d at 327. The Court found support for this proposition in Wilshire 
Oil Co. of Texas v. Riffe, 406 F.2d 1061, 1062-63 (lOth Cir. 1969), in which the Tenth Circuit 
stated that it is no defense to a breach of fiduciary duty that the division for which a disloyal 
corporate officer was responsible made a profit during the period he engaged in competitive 
enterprises. 
62 389 Mass. at 14, 449 N.E.2d at 327. 
63 Jd. at 15, 449 N.E.2d at 328. The defendants were given two opportunities to present 
evidence as to the fair value of their services: at the master's initial hearing and at a 
recommittal hearing which the superior court ordered to give the defendants a second 
chance to present proof. Jd. The defendants, however, did not utilize this second opportu-
nity, since they neither presented evidence on the scheduled date of recommittal hearing nor 
appeared at the scheduled hearing on their motion for a continuance. Jd. at 14-15, 449 N.E. 
2d at 328. 
64 Jd. at 17, 449 N.E.2d at 329. 
65 Jd. 
66 Jd. at 16, 449 N.E.2d at 329. 
67 ld. The Court cited 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS§ 1002 (Perm. ed. 1975). RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at§ 405(2) states that an agent 
is liable to his principal if he directs or permits improper conduct by other agents. 
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liable since they were found by the master to have ''approved, concealed, 
and acquiesced" in Graff's and Wormwood's breaches of their fiduciary 
duties.68 
Finally, the Chelsea Court affirmed the superior court's award of dam-
ages to Chelsea for the fair value of the services of the three Chelsea vice 
presidents who were required to divert their services to Ideal after the 
departure of the defendants and their accomplices. 69 The defendants 
argued that they should not be held liable for compensation paid to· their 
replacements because they and Graff and Wormwood were employees at 
will. 70 The defendants had further maintained that had they stayed, 
Chelsea would have spent far more in salaries.71 According to the Court, 
these arguments ignored the master's finding that Chelsea incurred these 
expenses because of the weakened position in which Ideal was left as a 
direct result of the four employees' disloyal conduct. 72 The Court thus 
held that Chelsea was entitled to the reasonable value of these executive 
office~s' services measured by their salaries and the time they otherwise 
would have spent on work for Chelsea. 73 
The Chelsea decision solidified the legal principle first laid down by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Lincoln Stores that employees who occupy a 
position of trust and confidence owe a duty of loyalty to their employer. 74 
This duty of loyalty mandates that the trusted employee place the inter-
ests of his employer above his own interests.75 More specifically, the 
Chelsea Court stated that an executive employee is prohibited from 
"actively competing" with his employer while in his employ, even though 
there is no covenant not to compete in his contracV6 The Court also 
agreed with Lincoln Stores that an employee may plan to compete with 
his employer as long as the execution of these plans does not include acts 
in violation of his fiduciary duty to his employer. 77 
The Chelsea case provides the most egregious example of disloyal 
68 389 Mass. at 16, 449 N.E.2d at 329. 
69 /d. at 17-18, 449 N.E.2d at 329. 
70 /d. at 18, 449 N.E.2d at 329. As they were employees at will, "Chelsea was free to 
discharge [the defendants] at any time, and the defendants were free to leave at any time 
without incurring liability for compensation paid to their replacements." /d. 
71 /d. 
72 /d. at 18, 449 N.E.2d at 330. 
73 !d. The Court found that Chelsea was entitled to recover the cost of the three execu-
tives' services in training replacements for Graff and Wormwood, as well as for the defen-
dants, since the defendants interfered with Chelsea's relations with these two einployees./d. 
at 19 n.23, 449 N.E.2d at 330 n.23. 
7
• Lincoln Stores, 309 Mass. at 418, 424, 34 N.E.2d at 705, 708. 
75 389 Mass. at ll-12, 449 N.E.2d at 326. 
76 /d. at 12, 449 N.E.2d at 326. 
77 /d. at 10, 449 N.E.2d at 326. See Lincoln Stores, 309 Mass. at 423, 34 N.E.2d at 707. 
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conduct found in the Massachusetts cases. 78 Previous cases involved the 
utilization of confidential information of the employer in the formation of 
a competing business, 79 the taking of secret profits from the employer's 
business,80 or generally, less pervasive acts of disloyalty .81 The Chelsea 
record included instances of each of these examples of disloyal conduct as 
well as others. The defendants overcharged Ideal for equipment that they 
bought, utilized a straw to conceal their involvement in the purchases, 
used Ideal's customer list to solicit customers for their competing busi-
ness, charged Ideal for travel and entertainment expenses incurred solely 
for their own benefit, and caused Chelsea to pay out salary increases and 
bonuses to themselves and other disloyal employees. The sheer number 
and diversity of disloyal acts by these defendants make the case most 
instructive in the corresponding number and diversity of remedies avail-
able to a similarly injured corporation. 
Among the damages awarded to Chelsea was restitution of the entire 
compensation paid to the defendants during their two years of disloyal 
conduct.82 There is clear precedent in Massachusetts for the proposition 
that a corporate director, officer, or trusted employee can be required to 
forfeit the right to retain or to receive compensation for conduct in 
violation of his fiduciary duty. 83 One of the earliest statements to this 
effect was a 1911 Massachusetts case, Little v. Phipps. 84 The Little Court 
stated that an agent who does not act with total loyalty towards his 
principal forfeits his right to compensation.85 The Supreme Judicial Court 
78 See Harry R. Defter Corp. v. Kleeman, 19 A.D.2d 396, 400, 243 N.Y.S.2d 930, 934 
(1963) for another example of egregious conduct on the part of disloyal employees. The New 
York court stated, "[the defendants'] audacity probably reached its peak when they paid, 
with the plaintiff's funds, the legal fees incurred in connection with the incorporation of 
[their competing business]. Their conduct was not only reprehensible, but completely 
astounding." I d. 
79 See Lincoln Stores, 309 Mass. at 419, 34 N.E.2d at 706 (employees used confidential 
information to determine size of inventory and capital needs for competing business). 
80 See Raymond v. Davies, 293 Mass. 117, 199 N.E. 321 (1936); Little v. Phipps, 208 
Mass. 331, 94 N.E. 260 (1911); Quinn v. Burton, 195 Mass. 277, 81 N.E. 257 (1907). 
81 See Anderson Corp. v. Blanch, 340 Mass. 43, 162 N.E.2d 825 (1959) (corporate 
officer-director found to have violated fiduciary duty by purchasing unneeded materials for 
corporation and concealing from corporation plans for competing business); Production 
Machine Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951) (officer-director violated 
fiduciary duty by diverting corporate opportunity to company in which he owned substan-
tially all the stock); Walsh v. Atlantic Research Associates, Inc., 321 Mass. 57, 71 N.E.2d 
580 (1947) (employee found unfaithful in secretly joining a competitor). 
82 389 Mass. at 12, 449 N.E.2d at 326. 
83 Id. See infra note 87 and accompanying text for cases in which total forfeiture was 
awarded. 
84 208 Mass. 331, 94 N.E. 260 (1911). 
85 Id. at 333-34, 94 N.E. at 261. 
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recognized that while the principal may have been benefited by some 
valuable service from the agent, the law's concern with preventing such 
corrupt behavior mandated total forfeiture. 86 Several subsequent Massa-
chusetts cases have agreed with the Little Court's reasoning and ordered 
forfeiture of the entire compensation.87 
There is also precedent in Massachusetts for allowing a disloyal em-
ployee to prove the value of his services and to repay only that portion of 
his compensation which is in excess of this amount.88 The source of this 
precedent may be found in Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove. 89 
The Pinkham Court recognized the general principle of forfeiture as 
enunciated by the Little Court, but stated that the principle was not 
inftexible.90 The Court found that the appropriateness of its application 
should be determined in the discretion of the court with reference to the 
particular facts.91 Applying this standard, the Court held that only partial 
forfeiture was appropriate in Pinkham because the salaries had not been 
paid as compensation for services but had been distributed to ensure that 
two factions of shareholders received equal sums from corporate distribu-
tions.92 Similarly, in Walsh v. Atlantic Research Associates, Inc. ,93 the 
Supreme Judicial Court ordered only partial forfeiture where a written 
employment contract provided that the employee was entitled to recover 
compensation irrespective of a breach of contract or the fact that it was a 
breach in bad faith.94 Finally, in Anderson Corp. v. Blanch ,95 the Supreme 
Judicial Court allowed a disloyal officer to retain the value of the services 
he properly performed. The Court, however, also found that the officer 
had not neglected his managerial duties, though he had purchased un-
needed materials for the corporation and had concealed his plans for a 
competing business from his employer.96 
86 Id. at 334, 94 N.E. at 261. 
87 See Swaney v. Clark-Wilcox Co., 331 Mass. 471, 475, 120 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1954) 
(Court stated unfaithful employee or fiduciary forfeits right to compensation); Production 
Machine Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 379, 99 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1951) (Court held entire 
compensation must be forfeited); Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 420, 34 
N.E.2d 704, 706 (1941) (Court ordered reimbursement of compensation); and Raymond v. 
Davies, 239 Mass. 117, 120, 199 N.E. 321, 322 (1936) (Court ordered forfeiture of salary). 
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at§ 469 (which states that "an agent is entitled to no 
compensation for conduct . . . which is a breach of his duty of loyalty."). 
88 See infra text accompanying notes 89-96. 
89 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482 (1939). 
90 Jd. at 4, 20 N.E.2d at 486. 
9t Id. 
92 Id. at 4-5, 20 N.E.2d at 486. 
93 321 Mass. 57, 71 N.E.2d 580 (1947). 
94 Id. at 62-63, 7l N.E.2d at 584. 
95 340 Mass. 43, 162 N.E.2d 825 (1959). 
96 Id. at 46-47, 162 N.E.2d at 827-28. 
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Given this latter precedent, it is not clear why the Chelsea defendants 
were given any opportunity, much less two opportunities, to prove the 
fair value of their services. The facts in Chelsea evince none of the 
mitigating factors found in those Massachusetts cases which ordered only 
partial forfeiture. Rather, the Chelsea record would seem to clearly man-
date total forfeiture. The Supreme Judicial Court thus may have rejected 
the absolutism of the Little decision, which dictates total forfeiture in all 
cases in which a fiduciary is found to have breached his fiduciary duty 
and, which allows no opportunity for a disloyal employee to prove the 
value of his services. At the same time, the Chelsea Court appears to have 
expanded the holding in Pinkham that an imposition of total forfeiture is 
not mandated in every case. According to Pinkham, the court in its 
discretion should make a case-by-case determination, based on the facts, 
as to whether a disloyal employee will be allowed to offer proof as to the 
value of his services. The Chelsea Court seems to have gone even further 
and indicated that disloyal employees will always be allowed to prove the 
value of their services, regardless of the factual circumstances of the case. 
The Chelsea Court's stance will clearly have a less powerful deterrent 
effect on future corrupt behavior by disloyal employees than the inflexible 
Little rule. Under Chelsea, disloyal employees who can prove the value of 
their services will receive or be allowed to retain the part of their compen-
sation which represents services properly performed. Although, unlike 
Pinkham, Chelsea extends this opportunity to all disloyal employees, the 
practical effect of this extension may be minimal. Employees, such as the 
defendants in Chelsea, who engage in extensive disloyal conduct, will 
face a heavy if not insurmountable burden in proving the value of their 
services. Thus, at least in the more egregious cases, the result reached by 
the Chelsea Court's approach will be the same as that reached by using 
the approach of the Pinkham Court. 
The Chelsea Court did make clear that forfeiture of compensation was 
not conditioned upon a showing of actual injury to the employer.97 The 
fact that Ideal was a profitable company during the period of disloyal 
conduct was irrelevant to the question of breach or resulting damages.98 
The master, however, found that Ideal suffered a loss in profits during 
fiscal 1977, the year in which the defendants' tenure with Ideal was 
terminated.99 The Court stated that Chelsea might have been successful in 
97 389 Mass. at 13, 449 N.E.2d at 327. 
98 Id. at 14, 449 N.E.2d at 327. In Quinn v. Burton, 195 Mass. 277,81 N.E. 257 (1907), the 
Court stated that though the principal "suffers no harm, or may have been benefited, this 
inquiry is unimportant, as the object of the law is to secure fidelity in the discharge of 
fiduciary duties, uninfluenced by considerations which necessarily are corrupt in their 
tendencies." Id. at 279, 81 N.E. at 257. 
99 389 Mass. at 13 n.21, 449 N.E.2d at 327 n.21. See supra note 60. 
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recovering these lost profits if it had been able to isolate how much of the 
loss was attributable to the defendants' disloyal conduct. 100 
In addition to forfeiture of their entire compensation, the Chelsea 
defendants were also required to repay compensation which had been 
paid to Graff and Wormwood. This particular form of relief is novel to 
Massachusetts, in that no prior case dealing with breach of fiduciary duty 
has awarded such damages .101 The Court found that because the defen-
dants had utilized Graff's and Wormwood's services for their own enter-
prise and not for Chelsea's, they must compensate Chelsea.102 The Court 
made clear that the defendants were not being ordered to make restitution 
to Chelsea of another employee's salary, but only to compensate for 
services they used to their own benefit.103 This clarification may have 
been made to emphasize that in the normal course of events, a defendant 
would not be required to make restitution of compensation paid to dis-
loyal fiduciaries who were not named as defendants. Such recovery would 
only be ordered where a defendant made use of another employee's 
services in order to effectuate his own personal goals. 104 
Finally, the Court allowed Chelsea recovery for the fair value of the 
services of the three Chelsea executives who devoted a substantial 
amount of time to Ideal's management after the defendants and their two 
accomplices left.105 The Court used a "but for" argument to link the 
diversion of the executives' services with the defendants' misconduct. 
The Court found that had it not been for the breaches of fiduciary duty by 
the defendants and Graff and Wormwood, the Chelsea executives would 
have been engaged in other profitmaking activities for Chelsea.106 The 
Court also stated that Chelsea was entitled to recover the costs of training 
replacements for the defendants and Graff and Wormwood.107 The costs 
of training replacements for the latter two employees were ascribed to the 
100 ld. The master was unable, based on the evidence presented, to determine how much 
of Ideal's loss in profits was the defendants' responsibility. 
101 The Chelsea opinion does not indicate why Chelsea did not name Graff and 
Wormwood as defendants, for under the legal principles stated in Chelsea, they too would 
clearly have been found to have acted in violation of their fiduciary duties ofloyalty. In fact, 
the master found that Graff and Wormwood had acted in violation of their fiduciary duties. 
ld. at 11, 449 N.E.2d at 326. 
102 Id. at 16, 449 N.E.2d at 328. In addition, the defendants were directly responsible for 
the payment by Chelsea of salary, salary increases, and bonuses to the two accomplices. I d. 
at 16, 449 N.E.2d at 329. 
103 Id. at 17, 449 N.E.2d at 329. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
104 See REsTATEMENT, supra note 12, at§ 405(2) (which states that an agent is liable to his 
principal if he directs or permits the improper conduct of other agents). 
105 389 Mass. at 17-18, 449 N.E.2d at 329. 
106 I d. at 18, 449 N .E.2d at 330. . 
107 Id. at 19 n.23, 449 N.E.2d at 330 n.23. 
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defendants because the defendants had interfered with Chelsea's relations 
with these two employees. 108 
The Chelsea Court provided the injured corporation with a wide range 
of recoveries. As has been stated, one of the recoveries awarded, the 
required repayment by the defendants of the compensation which had 
been paid to Graff and Wormwood by Ideal, was especially significant in 
that it had not been awarded previously in Massachusetts for a violation 
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. This indicates that the Court is concerned 
not only with providing a deterrent to future corrupt behavior by 
fiduciaries, but also with compensating an injured employer to the 
greatest extent possible. 
In summary, the Chelsea Court held that employees in a position of 
trust owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their employers. Although, as 
fiduciaries, these employees may not actively compete with their em-
ployer while in his employ, they are not totally precluded from entering 
into a competing business. Rather, they may plan for the creation of a 
competing business provided that their actions do not otherwise violate 
their fiduciary duties. The Chelsea Court found the record replete with 
acts of disloyalty by the defendants including, inter alia, soliciting cus-
tomers of Ideal for the defendants' planned business, misappropriating 
confidential information from Ideal, and enticing fellow employees away 
from their duties. The Court ordered the defendants to forfeit the entire 
compensation they received over their two years of disloyal conduct. 
They also were required to repay the compensation that Chelsea paid to 
two fellow employees, whose services the defendants diverted from the 
corporation for their own benefit. Finally, the defendants were ordered to 
pay the cost of the services of the three Chelsea executives whose ener-
gies were deflected to repair the damage done to Ideal as a result of the 
defendants' misconduct and abrupt departure.109 
§ 3.4. Dissolved Corporation - Personal Liability of Officers.* In Mas-
sachusetts, a corporation may be dissolved by the Supreme Judicial Court 
upon petition by the state secretary. 1 The secretary may petition for the 
dissolution of a corporation if it has failed to file annual reports or tax 
108 Jd. See also BBF, Inc. v. Germanium Power Devices Corp., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 
176, 430 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (1982) (Court allowed injured corporation opportunity to prove 
cost of training or finding replacements for employees whose services were diverted by 
defendants). 
109 The damages in Chelsea amounted to almost $459,000. 389 Mass. at 20 n.25, 449 
N.E.2d at 330 n.25. 
* Thomas Finigan, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.4. 1 G.L. c. 156B, § 101. On involuntary dissolution in Massachusetts, ~ee C. 
PEAIRS, BUSINESS CORPORATIONS, 13 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES, §§ 161, 163 at 311-16 & 
323-25 (1971). 
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returns for two consecutive years, or if, in the opinion of the secretary of 
state, the corporation has become inactive and its dissolution would be in 
the public's interest.2 Under Massachusetts law, even after the corpora-
tion has been dissolved, it can continue to operate for three years to wind 
up its affairs and liquidate.3 During this three year period, however, the 
corporation may not operate for the purpose of continuing the business 
for which it was established.4 Prior to the Survey year, no case in the 
Commonwealth had considered whether an officer can be held personally 
liable on contracts entered into on behalf of a dissolved corporation.5 
Recently, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts considered for the first 
time whether officers of a dissolved corporation are personally liable 
when the corporation continues its regular business operation after disso-
lution.6 
In Barker-Chadsey v. W. C. Fuller Co., Inc. ,7 the defendant corpora-
tion, W. C. Fuller Co., Inc. ("Fuller, Inc.") was engaged in the retail 
hardware business and was operated by Claire Quintin and Girard Quin-
tin.8 The Quintins were the sole officers, directors and shareholders of the 
company.9 On September 11, 1969, Fuller, Inc. was dissolved upon the 
application of the state secretary for failure to file annual reports or to pay 
franchise taxes, but continued to do business as before. 10 The plaintiff 
corporation, Barker-Chadsey Company ("Barker"), a wholesale 
supplier, had supplied merchandise to Fuller, Inc. for some time.U On 
May 9, 1975, Claire Quintin, acting as treasurer of Fuller, Inc., executed a 
promissory note from Fuller, Inc. to Barker for $37,721.12 At the same 
time, Quintin executed a security agreement which covered the Fuller 
inventory.13 In February of 1977, Fuller, Inc. defaulted, and Barker then 
2 G.L. c. 156B, § 101. The filing of annual reports is required by G.L. c. 63, § 53, and the 
payment of franchise taxes by G.L. c. 63, § 58. 
3 G.L. c. 156B, § 102. The effects in general of forfeiture, dissolution and winding up are 
covered in 16A W. FLETCHER, CYLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS C. 65 §§ 
7%5-8226 at 8-571 (rev. ed. 1979). 
4 Id. 
5 In Massachusetts, the rules regarding pre-incorporation contracts are firmly established. 
The promoter of an unformed corporation can be held personally liable on contracts entered 
into on behalf of the nonexistent corporation. See Corporations, 1979 ANN. SuRv. MASS. 
LAW § 2.1, at 17. 
6 On the liabilities of officers as trustees after dissolution, see W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF 
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, § 7.04 at 173 (3d ed. 1978). 
7 16 Mass. App. a. 1, 448 N.E.2d 1283 (1983). 
8 Id. at 1-2, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
9 Id. at 2, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
10 ld. 
II fd. 
12 I d. The note represented the amount Fuller owed Barker for goods bought plus interest. 
/d. 
13 Id. 
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brought an action to foreclose on the security and recover on the note .14 
Fuller, Inc. gave up the inventory voluntarily and ceased business opera-
tions.15 Barker realized $9,639 by private sale of the inventory .16 
Subsequently, Barker discovered that Fuller, Inc. had been dissolved 
over seven years earlier Y After making this discovery, Barker amended 
its complaint to include a claim against Claire Quintin personally on the 
note. 18 Barker also added an alternative claim against both Claire and 
Girard Quintin personally for goods sold.19 The Quintins denied the 
claims, and the case was sent to a master for report, "facts final." 20 
The master concluded that the Quintins were not personally liable but 
that Fuller, Inc., as a corporate entity, was liable for the balance of the 
note plus interest, costs and expenses.21 In the master's view, when Claire 
Quintin executed the note as treasurer of Fuller, Inc., she did not know 
the corporation had previously been dissolved.22 According to the master, 
Quintin did not intend to make the note as an individual. 23 Rather, she 
believed Fuller, Inc. was still an ongoing corporate entity. 24 Quintin 
believed that the annual report, required by statute, had been filed. 25 She 
did not know, according to the the master's findings, for which years a 
filing had been done.26 The master found that the last corporate tax return 
filed by Fuller, Inc. was for the fiscal year ending in June, 1975.27 This 
return was not filed, however, until 1978.28 With respect to Barker, the 
master found that Barker did not know that Fuller, Inc. had been dis-
solved when it took the note.29 According to the master's report, Barker 
looked to the corporate assets of Fuller, Inc. for security, and not to the 
individual assets of the Quintins.30 
On cross-applications to adopt and modify the master's report, the 
superior court judge affirmed the master's conclusion that the Quintins 
14 ld. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. 
19 Id. 
20 ld. 
21 Jd. at 3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
22 Jd. at 2-3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
23 Jd. at 3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
24 Id. 
25 ld. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. 
28 /d. The master noted that a fire caused by lightning destroyed all the corporate records 
of Fuller, Inc. in 1974. Id. at 3 n.4, 448 N.E.2d at 1284 n.4. 
29 Jd. at 3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
30 ld. 
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were not personally liable. 31 The judge, however, charged the Quintins as 
trustees in Barker's favor to the extent of any property that they held to 
which Fuller, Inc. would be entitled if revived. 32 Barker then appealed the 
judgment of the superior court to the Appeals Court of Massachusetts. 33 
On appeal, Barker maintained that the Quintins should be personally 
liable based on the absence of a valid agency relationship between the 
Quintins and Fuller, Inc.34 Barker argued that when Claire Quintin signed 
the note as treasurer, no corporation existed, and therefore no principal 
existed.35 Because there was no principal, Barker theorized, the Quintins 
could not have acted as agents.36 Therefore, if the Quintins had not acted 
as agents, then they must be personally liable.37 
In its analysis, the court noted that Barker's argument relied on the long 
line of Massachusetts cases dealing with promoter liability. 38 In Massa-
chusetts, promoters have traditionally been found personally liable on 
contracts entered into on behalf of intended, but unformed, corporations 
on the theory that when a corporation does not yet exist, there can be no 
agency relationship.39 As a result, the promoter's contract is personal and 
he is individually responsible for obligations assumed thereby. 40 
The court rejected the promoter liability analogy, and relied instead on 
Fay v. Noble ,41 an ancient Massachusetts case involving stockholder 
liability for the debts of an unformed corporation. In Fay, a corporation 
was supposedly organized and capital stock distributed.42 Later examina-
tion of corporate records indicated that the corporation had never been 
properly formed. 43 The Fay court rejected the theory that because no 
corporation had been formed, the stockholders were personally liable as 
copartners. 44 On the contrary, the court stated that the stockholders had 
not contemplated or assented to liability as copartners. 45 It would be 
31 !d. 
32 /d. 
33 /d. 
34 /d. 
35 /d. at 3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284-85. 
36 !d., 448 N.E.2d at 1285. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. at 3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
39 For a discussion of Massachusetts law with respect to corporate promoters, see 
Corporations, 1979 ANN. SuRv. MA.ss. LAw§ 2.1, at 17. 
40 /d. 
41 61 Mass (7 Cush.) 188 (1851). 
42 /d. at 189. 
43 /d. 
44 /d. at 192-93. 
45 /d. at 192. 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/6
§ 3.4 CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 69 
unfair, the court reasoned, to impose copartner liability upon sharehold-
ers who had not intended to assume such responsibility .46 
The Barker-Chadsey court adopted the reasoning of Fay as the basis of 
its analysis of the liability of officers of dissolved corporations. The 
proper inquiry, according to the court, was whether the parties contracted 
with the understanding that the liability was corporate rather than per-
sonalY In the court's view, it would be unfair to hold an individual 
personally liable if the mutual understanding of the parties to the agree-
ment was that the corporation was the contracting party and no misrep-
resentation occurred.48 In the Quintins' case, the court stated, all parties 
to the transaction understood that the liability was to be corporate and not 
individual.49 In addition, the court noted that no manipulative purpose 
appeared to exist on the basis of the record before it. 50 
The court next analyzed the statutes dealing with dissolution and revi-
val of corporations to determine whether any statutory policy mandated 
personal liability .51 The court acknowledged that a corporation's exis-
tence does not entirely terminate upon dissolution.52 Rather, it maintains 
some dormant form of life for three years for the purposes of winding up 
and liquidation.53 In Fuller, Inc.'s case, however, the court stated that 
active business was carried on because Claire Quintin was simply igno-
rant of the fact of dissolution.54 The court noted that in such a situation, 
officers and other interested parties may apply to the state secretary for 
"revival" of the corporation.55 
The effect of revival under chapter 156B, section 108 of the General 
Laws, according to the court, is to confirm the corporate acts of officers 
made before revival. 56 The confirmation of corporate acts corre-
spondingly relieves the officers of personal liability .57 As persuasive au-
thority for this contention, the court cited a decision of the Delaware 
46 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 4, 448 N.E.2d at 1285 (construing Fay v. Noble, 61 Mass. (7 
Cush.) 188 (1851)). 
47 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 4, 448 N.E.2d at 1285. 
•• Id. 
49 Id. at 5, 448 N.E.2d at 1285. 
5o Id. 
51 Id. 
52 ld. 
53 G.L. c. 156B, § 102. 
54 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 5, 448 N.E.2d at 1285. 
55 ld. 
56 Id. at 5-6, 448 N.E.2d at 1286. 
57 Id. The Court pointed to the language contained in the revival statute, G.L. c. 156B, § 
108, which states in relevant part, "all acts and proceedings of its [corporation's] officers, 
directors and stockholders, acting or purporting to act as such, which would have been legal 
and valid but for such dissolution, shall, except as aforesaid [apparently referring to revival 
on terms], stand ratified and confirmed." ld. 
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Supreme Court, Frederic G. Kropf & Son v. Gorson.58 In Gorson, the 
president of a one-man corporation entered into a contract after the 
corporation had been dissolved for reasons identical to the present case -
failure to file annual reports and pay franchise taxes.59 The court also 
found that the president in Gorson was unaware of the dissolution and 
that both parties had intended that the corporation be obligated under the 
contract.60 The Delaware court relied on Delaware statutory law to hold 
that the president was relieved of personal liability by reason of the 
revival of the corporation. 51 InBarker-Chadsey, the Appeals Court stated 
that the Massachusetts revival statute implies what the Delaware statute 
explicitly states - that contracts shall be the exclusive liability of the 
revived corporation.62 The policy of relieving the officers of a dissolved 
corporation of personal liability evidenced by section 108 is highlighted, 
according to the court, by the contrast to statutes in other states which 
expressly declare that revival does not affect the personal liability of 
officers for acts following dissolution.63 
The court next addressed the question of whether the Quintins should 
be barred from seeking revival because of the time lapse involved be-
tween the dissolution and the present action.64 According to the court, 
section 108 sets no precise time limit for seeking revival of a dissolved 
corporation.65 The court acknowledged, however, that the opportunity for 
revival had arguably lapsed a reasonable time after the Quintins received 
notice by means of Barker's amended complaint that Fuller, Inc. had been 
dissolved.66 To decide whether Fuller, Inc. should be denied revival, the 
court considered the competing interests involved. On the one hand, the 
court noted, holding the Quintins personally liable would give Barker a 
58 243 A.2d 713 (Del. 1968). 
59 Id. at 714. 
60 ld. 
61 Id. at 715. The relevant Delaware statute is DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 312(e) (1975): 
Upon the filing of the certificate in accordance with§ 103 of this title the corporation 
shall be renewed and revived with the same force and effect as if its certificate of 
incorporation had not been forfeited pursuant to subsection (c) of§ 136 of this title, or 
inoperative and void, or had not expired by limitation. Such reinstatement shall 
validate all contracts, acts, matters and things made, done and performed within the 
scope of its certificate of incorporation by the corporation, its officers and agents 
during the time when its certificate of incorporation was forfeited pursuant to subsec-
tion (c) of § 136 of this title, or was inoperative or void after its expiration by 
limitation, with the same force and effect and to all intents and purposes as if the 
certificate of incorporation had at all times remained in full force and effect. 
62 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 7 n.12, 448 N.E.2d at 1286 n.12. 
63 ld. 
64 Id. at 7-8, 448 N.E.2d at 1287. 
65 Id. at 8, 448 N.E.2d at 1287. 
66 ld. 
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windfall beyond its contractual expectations. 67 On the other hand, accord-
ing to the court, the fact remained that Fuller, Inc. had been delinquent to 
the state.68 In order to achieve a fair result, the court decreed that its order 
relieving the Quintins of personal liability would be contingent upon their 
timely application for the revival of Fuller, lnc.69 Until such a revival was 
obtained, however, the Appeals Court upheld the ruling of the superior 
court that the Quintins be charged as trustees in Barker's favor to the 
extent of any property they might hold to which Fuller, Inc. would be 
entitled if revived. 70 The court again cited Gorson as authority for giving 
effect to a revival obtained after an action had been brought against the 
corporate officer.n While the court stated that no case could be found 
where securing revival figured explicitly as a condition of relief granted on 
appeal,72 it had no objections to this idea in principle.73 
Although not readily apparent, the decision in Barker-Chadsey can be 
reconciled with the general rule in Massachusetts concerning promoter 
liability. In Massachusetts, as in most other jurisdictions, the general rule 
of promoter liability is that the promoter will be held personally liable on 
contracts entered into on behalfofintended but unformed corporations.74 
This rule does not adhere, however, when the parties agree that the 
corporation alone will be liable on the contract. 75 In Barker, all parties 
appear to have operated under the assumption that Fuller, Inc. still 
existed. 76 In effect, this assumption was treated by the Barker court as an 
implicit agreement that the corporation alone would be liable. The court, 
therefore, held the agency theory that an agent cannot contract for a 
nonexistent principal inapplicable. 77 
67 Jd. 
68 Jd. 
69 Jd. 
70 Jd. 
71 Jd. 
72 ld. 
73 Jd. 
74 Corporations, 1979 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW,§ 2.1 at 17. 
75 /d. See a/so 1A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 
215 at 466 (1983). 
76 The master concluded both parties intended that Fuller's assets be the security for the 
note. 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
77 The agency principle, stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 326, comment a 
(1958), reads: 
There is an inference that a person intends to make a present contract with an existing 
person. If, therefore, the other party knows that there is no principal capable of 
entering into such a contract, there is a rebuttable inference that, although the 
contract is nominally in the name of the nonexistent person, the parties intend that the 
person signing as agent should be a party, unless there is some indication to the 
contrary. Jd. (emphasis added). 
The Court determined that the Quintins avoided the application of this principle on two 
33
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The Barker-Chadsey decision, however, will not likely be useful prece-
dent for the typical case involving liability of officers of a dissolved 
corporation. For reasons unexplained by the court, the Quintins were 
unaware of the dissolution of Fuller, Inc.78 Such lack of knowledge will 
not normally form the basis for a defense because the dissolution statute 
expressly provides for notice prior to decree.79 Hence, the typical officer 
will know of the dissolution of the corporation. The officer's activities are 
then limited to the winding up of affairs.80 Should the officer continue to 
enter into contracts on behalf of the nonexistent corporation, it is unlikely 
a Massachusetts court would rely on Barker-Chadsey to absolve the 
officer from personal liability. Rather, the officer will likely be held 
personally liable on the theory that chapter 156B had been violated 
because the officer had knowingly gone beyond the settlement of affairs 
after dissolution. 81 As a result, the impact of Barker-Chadsey upon Mas-
sachusetts corporation law appears to be limited to its rather peculiar 
facts. 
grounds. First, it was found that they were unaware that no principal existed, and second, 
the indications were that the parties intended the Quintins not to be personally liable. 16 
Mass. App. Ct. at 3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
78 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 2-3, 448 N.E.2d at 1284. 
79 G.L. c. 156B, § 101. 
80 G.L. c. 156B, § 102. 
81 For a collection of cases involving liability in the case of pretended but nonexisting 
corporations, see 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 
§ 1121 at 188-90 (rev. ed. 1975). See also W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS, § 7.04 (3d ed. 1978). 
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